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## I. Estimated Long Range Significance of Antarctica to the USSR

## A. Background

Soviet interest in Antarctica is intelligible only against the background of the complex of interrelated considerations: scientific, strategic, economic and political. The Soviets have come to attach the greatest importance to earth science research: geophysics, geology, geography due to the great dependence placed upon and their successful contribution to the industrialization of the Soviet Union. It may not be too strong a statement to state that the very foundations of Soviet industrialization itself came to depend in part on the primary dependence placed upon earth scientists from the earliest period of Leninist rule to survey, map, and develop the natural resources of the Soviet Union. Similarly, earth scientists have also been charged to aid the fatherland in the struggle against nature, in which the drought problem was an immediate urgency and given primary consideration. As a consequence early importance became attached to the development of capabilities to forecast the caprices of dynamic geophysical phenomena. The benefits to be derived from such capabilities were indivisible: economic, military and political. To be able to forecast for economic necessities made it also possible to forecast for military operational needs; both assumed importance to sustain the State and its ideological foundations. Thus under the struggle compulsions of communist ideology, basic research has simultaneously economic, military and political significance. Physical

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environmental data for operational purposes becomes equally important with mechanical design data in the "hardware" development. This has been reflected in the Soviet restriction of many forms of earth science data as well as many types of mechanical data. Substantial investments have been made in earth science research, development and education from the earliest days. After an initial period of emergency activity earth science moved into the field of basic research. For example, by 1930 a magnetic survey of the entire country was launched, in 1932 a gravimetric survey was decreed. Topographic mapping of the entire country evolved. The study of the Arctic for the development of the Northern Sea Route was begun in the earliest years of Soviet rule. With evolving success, such support has been continued up to the present, with the result that Soviet earth scientists have never been without required fiscal support. As progress developed in the study and of earth science phenomena in the fulfillment of projects for immediate domestic needs, particularly after World War II, Soviet scientific interests advanced into the worldwide study of the earth as a whole. This expansion of interest is inherent in the nature of earth science phenomena themselves: (1) no two points in, on, or above the earth are identical; (2) these phenomena are dynamic in space and time; (3) there is a dynamics, worldwide interrelationship of these phenomena; and (4) observational data become progressively more

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meaningful the greater their accumulation in time and area. Thus, after the initial completion of studies, the Soviets with their large number of personnel, and research institutes were prepared to expand their efforts into a worldwide program. The launching of the IOY offered the most timely of opportunities to participate in an organized, coordinated and systematic worldwide program to bring in a vast fund of data that otherwise could not have been collected.

Some indication of the significance of this program to total Soviet interests is indicated in the fact that prior to the IOY the Soviets had not been willing to form the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics in order to avoid any pressures to share any of its significant and voluminous data (except for weather data) with the rest of the world.

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**SECRET****B. Strategic**

The strategic significance stems initially and primarily from the scientific importance of south polar data to the sum total of world observations as well as for their regional significance. Although ostensibly brought to the area for the IGY program it is significant to note the expansion of Soviet activities that either have no relevancy to the IGY program or the stress upon those subjects of the IGY that have particular value to military objectives. Sea and air navigation studies, the compilation of navigational-hydrographic descriptions for navigational aids, topographic surveying and mapping represent the former. The heavy emphasis on Soviet oceanographic program, which is greater than the combined program of all other countries, U.S. included, and the emphasis of wave studies, sea ice conditions, ocean floor geology, represent efforts that clearly reflect the development and improvement of air and sea operations capabilities. The heavy emphasis on gravimetry beyond the core interest of the IGY program represents an effort that can contribute basic knowledge significant to guided missile capabilities. Given their presence in Antarctica for basic scientific purposes, however, there are additional concurrent benefits that take on strategic importance. Presence on the ice cap provides the only Soviet outpost under exclusive Soviet control in the Southern Hemisphere. Therefore, in addition to the long-range scientific benefits the Soviets have available a secure source of data in the "water hemisphere" that could support supply weather and ionospheric storm

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forecasting and also serve as a communications transmission center for submarine operations during an emergency period. The regional operational experience on the ice cap as well as on the seas provides a proven capability to operate under the conditions and in the environment uniquely characteristic to the generally higher elevations, colder temperatures, lower oxygen content, and lower air pressures that characteristically differentiate the Antarctic from the Arctic. In this connection we believe that several published remarks of Dr. D. I. Shcherbakov, a leading figure in Soviet Antarctic scientific planning, are noteworthy. In one source he categorically stated (1956) that "the Antarctic, its shores and islands, are strategically important." In another instance, he expressed his personal conviction that the Soviet Union will continue its scientific operations "since they are extremely necessary to strengthen a variety of applied branches of science: sea and air navigation, forecasting service, the whaling industry and others." He envisioned, after the IGY, the improvement of continuously operating bases for scientific research and economic development, and also the establishment of settlements around meteorological and radio bases, as in the Soviet Arctic. Since the Soviets have disclosed plans to use nuclear-powered vessels in Antarctica, they presumably would be capable of establishing bases that could generate nuclear-power enough to make them self-sufficient for several years at sites that would be difficult to detect. Such concealed

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outposts could serve strategic purposes such as (a) tracking and control of earth satellite on military or reconnaissance missions (the main Soviet base has already engaged in the detection of the sputniks, and the Soviets have indicated plans to include rocket televising tests in their Antarctic rocket operations), (b) the monitoring of earth satellite of any nation for warning purposes, and (c) the providing of potential threats to shipping in sea lanes such as Drake Passage. In this context, current Soviet efforts to penetrate the Bellingshausen Sea may take on additional meaning, particularly if this should lead to an eventual establishment of a Soviet base somewhere within the area. Additional Soviet strategic interest might develop with the discovery of rare mineral deposits by the USSR or any other country. It is considered unlikely that this will play a significant role within the next decade of Antarctic development.

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**SECRET****C. Scientific**

Soviet scientific interest in the Antarctic dates back to Tsarist scientists. Soviet interest reaches back to the 1930's. In 1948 a continuously operating geographic observatory was proposed. With the second whaling expedition the Soviets began scientific observations by a special vessel. A categorical expression of scientific (meteorology) as a basis for Soviet rights to the continent was stated in the Soviet memorandum of 1950 protesting to the conferences on the U.S. internationalization proposal of 1948. Hence we feel that the Soviets would have undertaken continental observations whether or not the IGY had been launched. The special scientific interest stems from the Soviet expansion of earth science research from domestic USSR to a study of worldwide phenomena. In this expansion the Antarctic area represents a primary phase -- the study of inter-polar relationships. This bi-polar interest derives from the distinctive long-time accumulation of Arctic polar observations obtained by the Soviets over nearly three decades of research and exploration, and covering the Arctic basin from the Soviet shores to some points as close as two hundred miles of Alaskan and Canadian shores. To more fully benefit from their Arctic data the Soviets have much to gain through the accumulation of a comparable type, magnitude and coverage of south polar data. This may account from the scientific aspect at least, the expansion of Soviet scientific operations into (1) studies that are not a core part

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of the IGY program -- geology, geography, mineral-resource exploration, mapping, hydrographic charting and navigation studies, and (2) a far greater area coverage than originally announced in their IGY program.

Since we know that the Soviets have a strong interest in bi-polar research per se as an essential part of their interest in the study of worldwide interrelationship of geophysical and related oceanic, terrestrial, and atmospheric phenomena, and since these by their nature become increasingly meaningful with the continuous accumulation of data covering the widest possible area, we feel that the Soviets will continue to attach great scientific importance to the continuation of their observations in Antarctica indefinitely after the IGY.

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D. Economic

The economic significance of Antarctica is both direct and indirect.

Indirect importance derives from scientific data that will improve Soviet forecasting capabilities (weather, seismic, communications) for the Northern Hemisphere to support the practical needs of agriculture, housing, transportation etc., and from basic studies on marine biology and world ocean dynamics that will lead to improved estimates of ocean food resources for fishing requirements. Direct benefits, however, are derived entirely from whaling operations. The Soviet Union is the fourth largest (considering the UK and Union of South Africa separately) producer of Antarctic whale oil. The Soviets, however, have ambitious plans to increase their whale take. Three new catchers have already been added, and a whole new fleet is now in production, including a factory ship of 45,000 tonnage. In anticipation of this expansion the Soviet Antarctic program includes a special study of whale resources. Fuel and mineral resources, although present in the Antarctic, are of unknown value and are likely to remain unexploited for a long time to come. Nevertheless, the Soviets are undertaking geologic studies and mineral exploration. To date, only iron-ore deposits have been found, but one Soviet scientist speculates that, on the basis of geologic structure and analogy to Africa and South America, resources may include diamonds, rare elements, and precious metals.

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**E. Political**

Political interest in Antarctica is based primarily if not entirely on a complex of Soviet scientific, economic, and strategic considerations. Since 1933 Soviet policy has consistently limited itself to an assertion of rights to be a participant in any resolution of Antarctic sovereignty. We feel that the primary goal of Soviet interest is to remain on the continent at their own pleasure and with the right of access to any place in the area -- on land, ice or sea. It is our view that any overt act that may in any way threaten that right of access and freedom of operation will meet with diplomatic protest and a general appeal to all non-claimant countries, probably through UN channels, on the grounds that such act or acts (1) threaten world peace, (2) deny all rights to all countries having an interest in Antarctica, and (3) are contrary to the right to scientific research for the benefit of all mankind.

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II. Extent and direction of existing USSR interest in Antarctica

A. Political position

No diplomatic action has been taken since the issuance of the memorandum of 1950 to re-assert Soviet rights to Antarctica. During the period of Soviet operations there has been a careful exclusion of any references to the political question in the Soviet press and foreign broadcasts. There have been several references to the problem by Soviet scientists in literature intended primarily for domestic consumption. There has been one notable exception, however, in a brief current event item published in the Soviet journal, Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 1957, which summarizes Western press accounts on "A New Bone of Contention" in Antarctica. The item notes the UK/Chile/Argentina conflict, describes US Operation High Jump (1947) as disclosing the real aim--i.e. military -- of the U.S., repeats U.S. intent to undertake nuclear testing, notes the pleas of the U.S. press and Representative Tollefson to make a claim for the 90°-150°W sector, speculates on whether the area will become a place for new conflicts or an opportunity for mutual understanding in the struggle against nature, and, finally, notes the proposals of the Soviet government for a solution "not by unilateral seizure but by negotiation between all countries concerned and on the basis of joint exploration and exploitation." In another rare instance, Dr. V. G. Kort,

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Chief of the Maritime Expedition of the Soviet Antarctic Expedition, 1955-56, in his report to the Collegium of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, (parent ministry of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route which serves as executive agent for the Expeditions) categorically declared that the USSR Antarctic explorations secures the right of the Soviet Union in the settlement of Antarctica's legal status. This frank admission clearly confirms our suspicions that the numerous activities by scientists -- such as the raising of the Soviet flag at several scattered points as well as at each station, giving Soviet names to geographic features, depositing Soviet notes in stone cairns and recurrent emphases on Soviet achievements in hitherto unexplored areas -- were explicitly undertaken to build up a basis for establishing Soviet rights to Antarctica. Similar recent action was taken by a Soviet whaling vessel which landed recently on an uninhabited Zavodovskiy Island (discovered by Bellingshausen) in the South Sandwich Islands, gathered scientific samples and erected a large sign surmounted by a Soviet star. There are also indications of continuing Soviet historical research to overcome a basic weakness in their assertions of prior Russian continental discovery by Bellingshausen. No Soviet evidence yet prosecuted demonstrates that Bellingshausen himself claimed to have made a discovery of the continent. Soviet research in 1957 has published two maps to demonstrate that Bellingshausens

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diary entries described continental ice features rather than just icebergs in a field of sea ice. We also believe that the expansion of initial plans for an ambitious year-long (1958-59) oceanographic survey of the zone of Antarctic convergence in the Pacific and Atlantic oceanic areas had more than just a scientific motivation. Plans were expanded in mid-1957 to penetrate the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas (off the Unclaimed Sector) with unprecedented seaward landings in the vicinities of Cape Dart and Thurston Peninsula. Even more recently the plans were again changed to attempt the feat by the end of the 1957-58 season (March or April). We feel that these changes were designed to gain added prestige for Soviet Antarctic activities by a feat which the U.S. had not accomplished in an area of exclusively U.S. activities and where its rights are least disputed. This would serve to (1) simultaneously broaden the range of Soviet activities at the opposite side of the continent to strengthen their claimed continent-wide interests, and (2) gain an impressive basis for challenging any claim to the Unclaimed Sector that would otherwise be based on a record of exclusive U.S. activities.

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**SECRET****B. Nature and direction of operational efforts**

As outlined in CIA/RR-GB-145 and further analyzed in CIA/SI 56-57 the nature of the Soviet program and the evolution of Soviet operations discloses a complex of interwoven interests: scientific, Antarctic operational experience, propaganda, and political. The operations of the Second Antarctic Expedition (1956-57) and plans and initial efforts of the Third (1957-58) disclosed a continuation of the direction of their interests initially revealed in their earlier planning and operations. Operations in 1956-57 increased on land and sea, with greater success attained by the latter. Despite additional tractors and aircraft difficulties were encountered in setting up the two main interior stations. One sledge-tractor train reached a point 536 miles (74°03' S - 97°23' E) from the coast intended to become Komsomol'skaya, an intermediate station to Vostok. The Vostok train, due to a late start and operational difficulties (high altitude, rarer atmosphere, loose snow), stopped 393 miles from the coast, 480 miles short of its destination at the South Geomagnetic Pole. No field attempt was made to establish Sovetskaya. These failures meant that no IGY observations were undertaken at the South Geomagnetic Pole or at Sovetskaya as planned. Observations, however, were taken at temporary Vostok I. Despite this setback other stations, particularly Oasis at ice-free, American-discovered, Bunger Hills.

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as well as into the interior. Geological studies were continued, and a detailed geological map of the Oasis (Bunger Hills) area was completed. Of particular importance to scientific, military and political interests were the Maritime Subdivision of the Soviet Expedition. This season two vessels, the Ob and Lena, undertook an extremely ambitious oceanographic and hydrographic survey west of Mirnyy. The Lena, with a remarkable adaptation of the Soviet Arctic - developed technique of landing scientists at widely scattered unprepared landing sites, used two fixed-wing aircraft by hoisting them on the ice from which hops were made into the interior. Landings of scientists were made at 94 different points to establish astronomic ground control for aerial mapping and hydrographic charting, as well as for geological, glaciological and geophysical observations. Echo soundings combined with radarscope photography was combined with the land operations for the reconnaissance charting and mapping of 1800 miles of coastline to 40°E longitude. The Ob although concentrating on deep water surveys also undertook some approaches to the coast up to 20°E longitude, before proceeding on a cross section of Antarctic - south Atlantic waters to Capetown and along five meridians between 56°- 60°S. In two seasons the Soviets have secured a fund of unique hydrographic data of significant value to naval capabilities covering coastal areas of 143°

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in longitudinal extent. While some of the oceanographic scientific data will be made available under the IOY agreement, it is doubtful whether the photography, geodetic control and sounding data, or charts compiled thereof, will be made available outside of the Soviet Union. Not only are these activities of significant value to scientific research and naval capabilities, but such a record of productive operations, together with their continental coverage, can be of value to support Soviet demands to the right to participate in any resolution of the sovereignty question.

It is believed that the Lena technique may be used by the Ob when it attempts its penetration of the Amundsen - Bellingshausen Sea Area.

For the 1957-58 season major activities include (1) a determination to establish the two interior stations, and (2) the attempt to penetrate the Amundsen - Bellingshausen Sea area with landings on the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector. The determination to set up the two interior stations may be further revealing of the depth of Soviet interest in Antarctica. Following the failure to set these stations up in the 1956-57 season, the scientific head of the Expedition operations qualified future plans for further penetration inland in 1957-58 on condition that "observations at Vostok I confirm the possibility for people to work during a long period at such remote parts of the Antarctic coast." Apparently operations at Vostok I not only proved the feasibility of inland operations

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but decisions to continue were supported with elaborate preparations. Five supercharged cross-country vehicles -- named Penguins by the Soviets -- and aircraft were specially designed to cope with the extreme conditions of the high inland plateau -- the low temperatures, low atmospheric pressure, and loose snow. Other gear and clothing was also specially prepared. Other substantial additions have included six aircraft (including two IL-12's -- raising the aircraft park to 20-- 15 100-horsepower tractors, 10 special truck-tractors, 46 sledges, 5 lighter sledges, plus special clothing, oxygen masks, and special huts. The Ob for its extensive undertaking was again re-outfitted, with the addition of new landing facilities, additional scientific instruments, and the addition of facilities for meteorological rocket launchings (to 100 kms. altitude) in the vicinity of Mirnyy and the Bellingshausen Sea area.

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III. Evidence of USSR intentions in Antarctica

A. Post-IGY interests -- scope and purpose.

Soviet interests are known to have been of long standing, dating to the 1930 when the Institute for the North considered organizing an expedition to Peter I Island. This is supported by the appearance of spots of books published on the Antarctic in the 1930's -- including the translation seven foreign books Scotts diary, and the books by Mawson, Shackleton, Byrd (2) and Amundsen -- as well as Soviet books, some by the Arctic Research Institute of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route. In 1954, Soviet scientists proposed a systematic study of Antarctica by means of a "continuously operating geographical observatory." Whaling operations, begun in 1946, have included a research vessel since 1947. Plans and steps, have been taken to expand whaling operations in the Antarctic. Last season two new whale catches were built in the Soviet Union and with a third addition have increased the fleet to 18. A new larger, 45,000-ton factory vessel is now under construction for Antarctic whaling. Three leading scientists have expressed categorical statements that the Soviets plan to continue in the Antarctic after the IGY. Dr. I. P. Bardin, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Soviet Interdepartmental Committee for the IGY has stated categorically as recently as October 1957 that with its

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foothold in the Antarctic through its IGY activity there is no intention whatsoever to give up this advantage, and it fully intends to after the end of the IGY. This conforms the earlier statements by Admiral V. I. Burkhavov, then Vice-Minister of the Ministry of the Merchant and River Fleet and Chief of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route and now transferred to Antarctic planning at the Academy of Sciences, by Dr. I. D. Shcherbakov, Chairman of the Council for Antarctic Research of the Academy of Sciences. A move toward regularization of Soviet Antarctic operations may be implicit in the establishment early in 1957 of an Antarctic Division in the Arctic Scientific Research Institute of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route, the responsible operations agency for Soviet expeditions. First moves toward post-IGY activity were disclosed by the Soviet representative at the Fourth CSAGI Antarctic Conference, Paris, 12-15 June 1957 when he joined in the formulation of a resolution on the question of post-IGY scientific interests which noted "the scientific importance of further observations in the Antarctic after the end of the IGY." Again present at the Ad Hoc Antarctic meeting called by the International Council of Scientific Unions in Stockholm, 9-11 September 1957, the head of the Soviet complex Antarctic Expedition disclosed plans for the continuation of six stations -- the five now in operations plus Sovetskaya now in process of becoming established

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The six-station net is planned to be manned by complement of 70 scientists. It is presumed that required support personnel would increase this number.

We feel that the Soviet post-IGY program in Antarctica will be designed to reflect the same interests that motivated the comprehensive series of their IGY and non-IGY topical and area coverage. In fact, we anticipated increased interest in Antarctica related to Soviet needs for their own Southern Hemisphere observation of their own future as well as U.S. satellites in the Southern Hemisphere. We also expect a general increase in their own operations. This is implicit in the disclosure by A. A. Blagonrovov, a leading scientist, of Soviet intentions to use nuclear fuel for marine transport to make both the Arctic and Antarctic accessible for year-round scientific research. With the already heavy investment made in permanent-type facilities, instrumentation and equipment it can be expected that the Soviets will continue to improve their observations and to expand the coverage. This is because earth science phenomena by their nature generate the need for more and more data over an ever increasing area. This has taken place in Soviet Arctic operations where the Soviets have made hundreds of landings of scientists on the ice of the arctic Basin, and it is expected that the Soviets will duplicate this with a similar extension of coverage eventually to all of Antarctica.

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Such may come from both sea landings at coastal points with penetrations inland, and by operations from Sovetskaya toward the Weddell Sea area where abandoned IOY bases would provide an incentive. Costs will prove to be no handicap to these activities. Increasing experience and improved capabilities will increase efficiency of effort. As operations become more routinized there will be some reduction in demand on facilities. This has been evident this season (1957-58) when the Thule Expedition was launched with two rather than three vessels, and the winter group has been reduced from 119 for the previous Expedition to 162. Costs of operation have been moderate: After an initial investment of 54,000,000 rubles of which 21,000,000 represented capital investments, the costs (exclusive of capital investments) rose from 33,000,000 to 47,000,000 for the 1956-57 expedition. With the reductions of the present operation 1957-58, it is estimated that costs will run about 40,000,000 rubles. With basic capital investments already made we feel that the expansion of activity over the long-term will occur mainly through extensive use of aircraft requiring no more than two vessels for logistical support. In this extensive use of aviation -- the Soviets have demonstrated landing operations for nine months out of a year, and with air drop flights, over ten months -- the Soviets in addition to their geophysical research program are also expected to eventually map the entire area at reconnaissance scales.

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just as they have covered the coast between  $93^{\circ}$  and  $40^{\circ}$ E in 1955-57, in order to (1) systematize their geologic and geographic data, (2) improve their navigational capabilities, (3) expand the network of points for Satellite observations.

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B. Soviet Territorial claims

There is no evidence or basis in available intelligence that would indicate Soviet intentions to make a territorial claim. To the contrary all Soviet statements of interest consistently point to a desire to retain freedom for research and exploration on the continent and its seas. We feel that more advantages would accrue to the Soviets not to make a territorial claim. Soviet assertions have been made to the prior Bellingshausen discovery of the continent as a whole and not to any piece of it (excepting specific islands -- Peter I, Alexander I, Zavodovskiy Island, etc.), therefore, the Soviets have no historical basis for claiming any specific part. By becoming a claimant the Soviets become one of the imperialists and thereby lose not only an important propaganda advantage for use against the imperialist camp including the U.S., but run the risk of alienating the neutralists and non-claimants and giving up its role of the defender of humanity's right. As a result the Soviets would become caught in the rigidities implicit in becoming a claimant and without any basis of appeal except "me too" to the neutralist powers. The Soviets would have to resign themselves to a restricted and lose the advantage of freedom of movement to all parts of the continent which is of greater interest to their worldwide scientific objectives relative

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economic requirements, and to their military advantages. The Soviets are fully aware that claims are not necessary for operations in any claimed sector. The long history of the U.S. position has amply demonstrated this. Because of the harsh environmental conditions and the limited capabilities of all claimants there is no danger of sanction application or forceful ejection by any of them. By free access to all of Antarctica the Soviets will not only gain the data desired for scientific and related reasons the Soviets are likely to propagandize their contributions to humanity.

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#### IV. Estimate of probable Soviet reaction to alternative U.S. actions

##### A. Probable Soviet estimate of western intentions

Soviet writers have consistently accused the U.S. of leading the wave to parcel out the American continent. This appears to be based in part at least, on the assumption that the U.S. took the initiative to establish a condominium in Latin America. In discussions the Soviet government protested. Having been made of the failure of this effort, and the tri-partite conflict of Argentina-Chile-UK, as a likely continuing obstacle to renewed internationalism or even to a U.N. control arrangement, it is our view that the Soviets are most likely to expect a U.S. claims action followed by a treaty that would attempt to exclude the USSR principally, as well as other non-Soviet states. Additional basis for this concern is reflected in Soviet reports that the 1939 and 1946 declarations by the Organization of American States and its predecessor outlined the zone of security to the South Pole. It can be argued, therefore, that the USSR would most likely expect an expanded regional march against Soviet interests. It would follow that the Soviets are least likely to expect an invitation to a conference without pre-conditions or an accompanying U.S. claim. Although proper, this is not a realistic estimate of what is conceivable that they may expect some results from their publicized position by an invitation to a "stalled" conference.

B. Likelihood of USSR recognition of a claim

We feel that there is no doubt that a strong protest would be launched and supported by propaganda campaign with a "I-told-you-so" attitude. The most violent reaction would be to a claim without any conference invitation. The Soviets would probably not respond to a conference invitation, if preceded by a claim, nor even if such were made simultaneously. If we assume that the Soviets have no claims interest, then it would be that participation in conference with claimant powers -- U.S. feel -- would carry with it a recognition of claims. We feel that since non-recognition of claims dominates Soviet policy that the Soviets would not respond to any invitation in which it would find itself a non-claimant in a conference dominated by claimants. Without such response the USSR would not become a member of any international authority.

C. Likelihood of response to conference call

We feel that the Soviets are more likely to respond to a conference call in which it would not be outnumbered by claimant powers -- even if the U.S. remained a non-claimant. We also feel that the greatest likelihood of favorable response would be to an organizing conference rather than to a conference where it would be confronted by a proposal previously agreed to by the other powers.

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D. Assertion of Soviet claims to counter U.S. claims

We believe that the USSR is not likely to become a claimant for reasons indicated in 3b. We do believe that the USSR will challenge the effectiveness of the treaty by ignoring it and continuing to operate regardless of its restrictions.

E. Soviet reactions to an international regime without Soviet Participation

We would expect the Soviets to object to the regime before the U.N. on the grounds that it harms all non-claimant countries some of which have definite interests in the Antarctic and a record of major accomplishment. We firmly believe that the Soviets would accuse the U.S. of wrecking the promising international cooperation developed under the IGY and as a sanction, might threaten to exercise its freedom of action with respect to the dissemination of Antarctic data.

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